



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

7 June 1982

DIA review
completed.

State Dept. review completed

DOE review completed.

Top Secret

CPAS NIDC 82-132C

7 June 1982


Copy

402

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1

UNCODED

25X1

Contents



25X6



25X1



Iraq-USSR: *Iraqi Official's Visit to Moscow* 7

25X6

Special Analyses




USSR: *Brezhnev's Political Standing* 11

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

Page Denied


Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied

UNCODED


Top Secret

25X1


25X1



IRAQ-USSR: Iraqi Official's Visit to Moscow

The Soviets handled Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz's visit to Moscow last week in a low-key manner. Although Aziz met with candidate Politburo member Ponomarev, *Pravda* only briefly mentioned the visit. A Soviet Foreign Ministry official has told the US that Moscow does not favor an Iranian move into Iraq but indicated the Soviets have no plans to take an active role in reaching a settlement of the war. 

25X1

Comment: Aziz was in Moscow to discuss the war and probably sought more Soviet support. The apparent discomfiture with his visit presumably stems from a desire not to raise suspicions in Tehran about the USSR's intentions. The Soviets evidently believe that any settlement of the conflict is a long way off and calculate that fence sitting offers the best chance of maintaining and eventually improving ties with both sides. 

25X1



25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

USSR: Brezhnev's Political Standing
[redacted]

25X1

The promotion of KGB Chairman Andropov to the party Secretariat and the selection of a compromise candidate to replace him in the KGB suggest that President Brezhnev's ability to personally determine key succession-related decisions may be eroding. As a result, Brezhnev's leadership now seems much more vulnerable to challenge, especially if his health deteriorates. Although the President's policies appear to enjoy continued Politburo backing, Brezhnev and his proteges will have to be alert to protect their political positions. [redacted]

25X1

A growing apprehension in the leadership about the increased status of Brezhnev's principal protege, Konstantin Chernenko, may have provided the impetus for Andropov's promotion. Although Chernenko reportedly never gained the respect of Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Andropov, he probably was not regarded as a likely successor to Brezhnev--particularly in view of the strong position of senior secretary Kirilenko. [redacted]

25X1

Brezhnev's advancement of Chernenko to fill Suslov's number-two spot in the Secretariat, combined with the physical and political decline of Kirilenko, apparently mobilized the opposition to Chernenko. By transferring Andropov to the Secretariat, Chernenko's opponents have placed a major obstacle in his path and established a new leading contender to succeed Brezhnev. This development may ultimately endanger Brezhnev's own position.

25X1

The Threat From Andropov

Brezhnev is likely to have recognized that opposition to Chernenko could increase his own vulnerability. Although Brezhnev may have seen merit in having an "alternative heir" in the Secretariat, Andropov probably would not have been his choice. [redacted]

25X1

--continued

Top Secret
[redacted]

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

Moreover, Brezhnev has always prevented the transfer of Politburo members into this key institution and kept those in the Secretariat from amassing sufficient power to threaten him. Andropov previously has been on good terms with Brezhnev and supported his foreign policy line--factors that may have kept Brezhnev from fighting the promotion. [redacted]

25X1

Nevertheless, Brezhnev almost certainly knows that Andropov--in view of his KGB connection and potential appeal in the Politburo--could become a rallying point for those who believe the party's interests would be best served by his "retirement." Brezhnev may be relying on Chernenko, who now appears to have some oversight responsibility for the KGB, to protect his interests. [redacted]

25X1

Fedorchuk: Uncertain Allegiances

The selection of Ukrainian KGB Chairman Fedorchuk to replace Andropov reinforces the impression that Brezhnev's power has waned. Brezhnev needed a strong protege in this post in order to isolate Andropov from his previous associations and thus reduce his vulnerability to a potential coup. Several candidates would have met these criteria. [redacted]

25X1

The KGB's First Deputy Chairman, Georgiy Tsinev, and possibly also Viktor Chebrikov, have ties to Brezhnev and should have been the two leading candidates if the Politburo wanted a career officer as chairman. Alternatively, Brezhnev could have advanced a political protege from the Politburo or one of the principal regional party organizations to guard his position. [redacted]

25X1

Assuming Brezhnev tried to impose either of these alternatives, the Politburo did not let him have his way, and debate in the leadership may have led to a compromise. Fedorchuk lacked both the political status within the party elite and the professional standing within the KGB necessary to make him a likely first choice on any list. [redacted]

25X1

--continued

Top Secret
[redacted]

Top Secret

25X1

Implications

The two appointments suggest that the Politburo is denying Brezhnev the power to designate his successor as party leader and possibly even to determine the timing of his departure. His authority in all other areas seems undiminished--as demonstrated at the recent plenum, when he won approval of the food program he had initiated, and by the new movement on arms control negotiations. Nonetheless, he may now feel under increased pressure to demonstrate that age and poor health have not reduced his effectiveness as party chief. [REDACTED]

25X1

Such pressure may have already led Brezhnev to undertake a more taxing schedule of public activities.

25X1

[REDACTED]

Brezhnev's departure from office, on the other hand, probably would not bring immediate alterations in foreign policy. Both Andropov and Chernenko apparently support his foreign policy line and endorse the current Soviet effort to engage in arms control negotiations with the US. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2008/08/19 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000300010118-4

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2008/08/19 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000300010118-4